A. In what ways do philosophy’s methods differ from those used in sciences such as neuroscience and economics? Why do they differ?
B. What are the three main branches of philosophy? (See "Philosophy as a Subject Matter," pp. xiv - xv, and look for the "three basic philosophical questions.") Notice that each branch raises one "foundational" question, and other related questions. What are these questions?

In BIP: p. xxii, question #4.
A. According to Aristotle, what are ethos, pathos, and logos (Aristotle, 7-8)? Can you give an example of each, other than the assigned videos?
B. Can you explain where the ethos is in the "Willie Horton 1988 Attack Ad"? Explain how the "Pathos commercial" is an example of pathos. Use Aristotle's text to support your answers.
C. Bailey provides an argument for the conclusion that “this rope will bear my weight” (Bailey, xvi). Is this argument deductive or inductive? How come?
D. Explain what philosophers mean when they say an argument is valid, and when they say it is sound (Bailey, xvii - xviii).

In BIP: p. xxii, question #3
A. Find--from outside our texts--or make up three bad arguments. Don't just re-word ones from the assigned readings; try to find really different sorts of bad arguments: bad inductive arguments, bad deductive arguments, arguments that seem bad in different ways. (Remember to cite whatever sources you use, per the integrity instructions.)
B. Identify what is wrong with the following argument: “God is love. Love is blind. Ray Charles is blind. Therefore, Ray Charles is God.” 

In BIP: pp. 17, questions #1, 2.
A. Bailey describes three types of argument for God's existence (Bailey, 2). In your own words, define each one.
B. Try to restate Anselm’s ontological argument in chapter 2 of Proslogion (Anselm, 7) in standard form. (Standard form is the numbered premise-conclusion format I often use in class; here is a guide to standard form.)

In BIP pp. 17, #4, 6, 7, 8
A. Many people have the sense that something is wrong with Anselm's argument. But what is it? Before criticizing it, review the "Common Misconceptions" in the introductory material (Bailey, 5). After that, what do you think is wrong with it (if you think something is wrong with it)?
B. Look carefully at Gaunilo's Paragraph 4 (Gaunilo, 9-10). What is Gaunilo saying about our understanding of God? How might this cause a problem for Anselm's argument?
C. Do the same for Gaunilo's Paragraph 6 (Gaunilo, 10): what does Gaunilo say about an island? How might this be a problem for Anselm's argument?

In BIP p. 49, question #8.
A. Can you restate Demea's cosmological argument (45-6), in a paragraph or in standard form? (It begins at, "The argument, replied Demea, which I would insist on, is the common one," and continues to the end of that paragraph.)
B. Cleanthes presents several objections to Demea's cosmological argument on pp. 46-7. Can you restate any of them in a paragraph, or in standard form?

In BIP p. 49, #2, 4, 6.
A. In these readings we have Cleanthes' design argument (Hume, 35) and several criticisms of it from Philo (e.g., Hume 35-40, 43-5). Take any one of those arguments and restate it either in a paragraph, or in standard form.
B. Philo presents several objections to Cleanthes' design argument. Rather than rebut the objections, Cleanthes seems content to conclude, "To this concession I adhere steadily; and this I regard as a sufficient foundation for religion" (Hume, 45). What does Cleanthes mean by this? Do you agree it is a sufficient foundation for religion? How come?

A. In "Evidence for Intelligent Design," Kenyon & Dembski argue for an intelligent designer to account for DNA. Try to restate their argument either in a paragraph or standard form. (Remember to cite; the academic integrity instructions show how to cite videos.)
B. How is the argument presented in "Evidence for Intelligent Design" similar to, and different from, those we have looked at so far?
C. Sagan argues for a naturalistic account of the origin of life. Try to restate his argument either in a paragraph or standard form. (Remember to cite; the academic integrity instructions show how to cite videos.)
D. What weaknesses can you find in Kenyon & Dembski's argument, and in Sagan's?

In BIP 124, questions #1, 4-7.
A. James mentions a famous argument for belief in God called "Pascal's wager" (113-4). What is Pascal's argument? Do you find it persuasive?
B. James claims that our passions "not only lawfully may, but must, decide" whenever we have options which cannot be decided purely by evidence (part IV, p. 116, and part VIII, p. 119). How does James argue for this?
C. How does James argue that it is hopeless to wait for proof (part VI)?
D. Clifford says we must refuse to believe without proof. How does James argue that refusing to believe may be costly (section IX)? (Look at his example of "Do you like me or not?" on p. 121.) How is this supposed to help James show we may believe in God?

A. In the first paragraph of the First Meditation Descartes says he will devote himself to “an earnest and unfettered demolition of my [former] opinions” (143). Why does he want to do this? How does he propose to accomplish it? (See the second paragraph.)
B. How does Descartes argue that his apparently waking experiences might be dreams (144, second full paragraph)? Which of his former beliefs does this “Dream Doubt” cast doubt on? Which are left over--i.e., what things are still true "whether I am awake or asleep" (144)?

Dreams Chuang-tzu Those who dream of a banquet may wake to lamentation and sorrow. Those who dream of lamentation and sorrow may wake to join a hunt. While they dream, they do not know that they dream. Some will even experience a dream within a dream; and only when they awake do they realize they dreamed of a dream. By and by comes the great awakening, and then we may find out that this life is really an extended dream. Fools think they are awake now, and flatter themselves they know if they are really princes or peasants. Confucius and you are both dreams; and I who say you are dreams—I am but a dream myself. This is a paradox. Tomorrow a wise man may come forward to explain it; but that tomorrow will not be until ten thousand generations have gone by. Once upon a time, I, Chuang Tzu, dreamt I was a butterfly, fluttering hither and thither, to all intents and purposes a butterfly. I was conscious only of following my fancies as a butterfly, and was unconscious of my individuality as a man. Suddenly I awoke, and there I lay, myself again. Now I do not know whether I was then a man dreaming I was a butterfly, or whether I am now a butterfly dreaming I am a man.

(This excerpt is borrowed from Humanistic Texts.)

A. On p. 144 Descartes says, "it becomes completely clear to me that there are no certain indicators which ever enable us to differentiate between being awake and being asleep." In other words, he is saying there is no absolutely sure way to tell whether you are awake or asleep. This is the conclusion of an argument. What are the premises for it? Try to put the argument in standard form. Is the argument inductive or deductive?
B. If Descartes is right that we cannot tell for sure whether we are dreaming or awake, what would that imply about our knowledge of material things? Why?
C. In the first two paragraphs of p. 145, Descartes argues that he may be wrong even about the simplest things, such as that 2+3=5. Can you explain his argument, or put it in standard form? (The argument starts at with "Nevertheless, a certain opinion has for a long time been fixed in my mind..." and ends with "there is nothing in the beliefs which I formerly held to be true about which one cannot raise doubts.")

A. How does Descartes become certain that he exists (Second Meditation, third paragraph)?
B. How does Descartes argue that he is a "thinking thing" (pp. 146, fourth paragraph, through the first paragraph on 148)? What does he mean by "a thing that thinks" (148, first paragraph)? (Proving what kind of thing he is is different from showing that he exists.)
C. Put yourself in Descartes's position, with Dream Doubt and Defective Nature Doubt. Suppose that "I exist" and "I am a thinking thing" are the only things you know. How might you proceed to find other things you could be absolutely certain of? Is it even possible? How come?

A. How is proving God exists helpful for Descartes's overall project? Specifically, how would it help him overcome "defective nature doubt"?
B. In the Third Meditation, Descartes argues that God must exist. (See especially lines 31-91; the brief restatements of his argument in lines 219-30 and 249-54 may be helpful.) Try to identify the premises and restate the argument in your own words (no quoting), in standard form. (Here is a guide to standard form.) Of the three types of argument that God exists (cf. assignment #4), which type is this argument? (This question is harder than it might seem. Consider all three kinds.)
C. In the second paragraph of the Fourth Meditation (lines 258-61), Descartes argues that God would never deceive him. Try to identify the premises and restate the argument (again, in your own words), in standard form. What do you think of the argument?

A. Descartes argues that his idea of God could only have come from God. Keeping in mind his descriptions of his idea of God (in the handout, see lines 82-6, 136-50, 167-75, 203-4, 228-30, 251-2), in what other way(s) could he have gotten this idea? (Keep in mind you must account for it being an idea of an actually infinite being that is perfect in all ways.)
B. What other objections might there be to Descartes's argument that God exists?
C. (If you haven't already written a response to this question before...) In the second paragraph of the Fourth Meditation, Descartes argues that God would never deceive him (lines 258-61). Try to identify the premises and restate the argument (again, in your own words), in standard form. What do you think of the argument?

In BIP p. 172, question #9. Also:
A. Descartes argues for the conclusion that "my mind is completely distinct from my body and can exist without it" (167). Try to identify the premises and restate the argument, in your own words, in standard form.

A. How does Descartes argue that “corporeal things exist”? (The argument is on p. 167; it starts at "Now, it is, in fact, true that I do have a certain passive faculty of perception..." and ends with "And therefore corporeal things exist.") Can you put this argument into standard form? (Here is the guide to standard form.)
B. What does Descartes think the proper purpose of the senses is (169)?

A. How convincing is Descartes's argument that material things exist? What objections can you think of besides any already discussed in class? Try make each objection into an argument with the conclusion "So, Descartes's argument is unsound."
B. If Descartes's argument for material things is bad, what would a good argument be? Is a good argument possible? (Don't forget Dream Doubt! Unless you can refute Dream Doubt, you cannot just say "material things exist because I can sense them," because your sensations could be dreams.)

A. How does Locke argue that we can be sure material things (e.g., tables and chairs) exist? His argument is in Book IV chapter XI, which starts on p. 184. Notice the text is divided into numbered sections (§1, §2, etc.). In sections 1-2 Locke says, essentially, that the way to show material things exist is to show that our ideas of them were caused by things outside us -- in other words, he needs to show that our ideas of tables and chairs are not just dreams or hallucinations. That much is similar to Descartes. But Locke's argument, given in sections 3-8 (pp. 184-6) is very different from Descartes's. Try to piece it together.

In BIP p. 189: questions #4, 6. Also:
A. Evaluate Locke's arguments that material objects exist. How are the various parts of it helpful (or not) in showing material objects exist? How strong are the various parts of it?

In BIP pp. 189, questions #1, 2, 5, 7.
A. According to Locke, what are primary qualities? (See especially p. 178 § 8, where he defines "idea" and "quality"; §§ 9-10, where he says which of our ideas come from primary qualities and which come from secondary qualities; and p. 179 § 15, where he says which ideas resemble the things that cause them.) Don't just list the primary qualities; try to define what makes something a primary quality. This can be confusing; Locke describes it differently in different places.
B. According to Locke, what are secondary qualities? (Again, see especially §§ 8-10 and 15.) Don't just list the secondary qualities; try to define what makes something a secondary quality.
C. How does Locke think we come to have an idea of substance (182-4)? How much does he think we actually know about substances?

A. Look carefully at sections 1-4 of Berkeley's Treatise. There is an argument here--or rather, the premises of an argument for the conclusion, "Material substance (matter) is inconceivable" or "We cannot know anything about material things." Can you piece the argument together? (It may be helpful to look carefully at sections 6, 22-3, and 34-36, where Berkeley sums up his view.)
B. How effectively, if at all, does Berkeley undermine your conviction (if you have it) that material things exist? Point to specific parts of his argument that you find especially relevant.
C. Berkeley denies we can know that matter exists, because we can have no idea of it. Yet he says we can know that mind exists. How does he argue for our knowledge of mind (sections 25-6)?

A. Look carefully at section 18. Starting at, "So if we are to have any knowledge of external things [i.e., material objects], it must be by reason, inferring their existence from what is immediately perceived by sense...," Berkeley argues that we cannot prove material things exist (i.e., that there can be no sound deductive argument for material things). Can you state the argument?
B. Look carefully at section 19. Beginning with, "But this is not tenable either," Berkeley argues that we cannot know that material things probably exist (i.e., that there can be no strong inductive argument for material things). Can you state the argument here?
C. In sections 29-32 and again in 145-149, Berkeley argues that God exists. What is his argument?

A. (This question only makes sense if we did assignment #23.) Locke identified certain qualities as primary qualities, claiming that the ideas they cause in us match how things really are. How might Russell's discussion of the table--especially his examples of texture, shape, and touch--challenge Locke on this point (Russell, 3)?
B. How does Russell argue that our perceptions of color, texture, and shape don't match how things really are (Russell, 2-3)?
C. Russell says it is "simpler" and more "natural" to believe that "there really are objects independent of us, whose action on us causes our sensations" (10). He argues for this in his discussion of the cat and the conversation with a person (10-1), which is an inference to the best explanation. How well does Russell show that the best explanation of our sense-data is that there is a real cat? How about with human beings (11)?

In BIP p. 428, questions # 2, 3, 5, 7.
A. Rée compares a stone, a donkey, and a person. Explain the comparison, and what it is supposed to show. How plausible is the comparison?
B. Eagleman claims that "most of what we do and think and feel is not under our conscious control" and that "Your consciousness is like a tiny stowaway on a transatlantic steamship, taking credit for the journey without acknowledging the massive engineering underfoot" (3-4). What do these claims imply about how free we are? What evidence does Eagleman give for them?
C. Explain how Eagleman compares your conscious mind to a newspaper reader (4-5). What does this suggest about how free we are?

In the PDF, p. 544, questions #1, 3-5.
A. Campbell says that we are free, but only in very specific, limited circumstances (e.g., on p. 550, at the very end of section 5). Try to articulate precisely what those circumstances are. When you choose freely, according to Campbell, what exactly are you choosing between? Does he think you always do what you choose to do?

A. A determinist might say, "Human behavior is very predictable. That shows that we do not have free will." How does Campbell respond to this objection (section 9, 552-3)?
B. Campbell considers the following objection: "Free will as you [Campbell] describe it is completely unintelligible" (section 10, 553). In your own words, explain what this objection means (Campbell explains it in the following sentences). How does Campbell respond to it?
C. How much are you persuaded by Rée that we are not free? How come?
D. How well do Campbell’s arguments respond to Rée’s? Why do you think so?

In BIP p. 444, questions #1, 2.
A. Ayer discusses determinism, and concludes that we cannot be sure whether it is true (439-40). What reasons does he give for this? (Look for what he says about the claim that everything has a cause, 439, and about our ability to predict what people will do, 440.)
B. How does Ayer argue that the only way we can be responsible is if determinism is true (440)?
C. How does Ayer distinguish between "constrained" and "free" actions? In other words, when does he think you are constrained, and when are you "free" (442)? Notice the different examples of constraint, such as the gun to the head and the kleptomaniac. How are these cases alike, and how are they different?
D. Ayer says you are free, and responsible, when your actions are not constrained, even though such "free" actions are determined. Do you think being unconstrained is a satisfactory basis for holding people responsible? How come?

A.
B.
C.

In the Dennett introductory material, pp. 566-7, #7,8.
A. One of the most important parts of Dennett's article is his third case (572-3). Look at it closely. Then think about how you have made some major decision in life, such as whether to come to DePauw. How well does this third case match your decision process? How plausible is it, then, as a description of how we decide?

A. Pulling from the writings of Frankfurt, Watson, and Taylor, Wolf identifies what she calls the "deep self" view. What is this view?
B. How does Wolf use the example of JoJo to identify a problem with the deep self view?
C. How does Wolf think that adding a condition of sanity to the deep self view helps remedy it?

This excerpt contains three short pieces: "The Tale of the Butcher,” “The Tale of the Dying Men,” and "The Tale of the Horses." You'll see that each tale has its overt content, but also hints at deeper meanings, suggesting broader lessons about how to live, the proper attitude to have towards adversity, and human nature & society. Our task will be to find those lessons. Look for them as you read.

A. At the end of “The Tale of the Butcher” the Prince declares that he has "learned how to care for life." What is it that he has learned? The lesson here is not about butchering meat, but about something deeper. What is it?
B. In “The Tale of the Dying Men,” how do the men’s attitudes towards death and suffering differ from what is “normal”? What do the men seem to tell us about our place in the world?
C. “The Tale of the Horses” suggests we compare ourselves with horses, and compare the history of our society with the history of our management of horses. What are we supposed to learn from this?

A. Taylor uses the myth of Sisyphus, and the example of the glow worms, to identify a perfectly meaningless existence. What, exactly, makes this existence meaningless? Do you agree that it is meaningless?
B. Taylor identifies two ways in which a life could acquire meaning. One is by culminating in something, such as if Sisyphus built a temple. Why does Taylor later condemn this as "the picture of infinite boredom"? Do you agree with his evaluation of it?
C. How does Taylor think that our lives can have meaning? He seems to think that this is the only way; do you agree that it is?

A. Imagine a conversation between Tolstoy and Chuang-Tzu's Dying Men. What might the dying men say to Tolstoy? How might Tolstoy respond?
B. Imagine a conversation between Tolstoy and Taylor. What might Taylor say to Tolstoy? How might Tolstoy respond?
C. What do you take to be Tolstoy's main point in this reading? Do you agree with it?
D. Which argument or claim in this reading struck you as most interesting, or enlightening, or wrongheaded? How come?

A. Socrates raises the question "whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods" (10a). What is the difference between these two?
B. What is the Euthyphro problem?
C. How might Tolstoy's proposal (having faith, following God's law, 8) run into the Euthyphro problem?
D. Identify at least one proposed solution to the Euthyphro problem. How satisfactory is it?

A. Glaucon explains "what justice is and what its origins are" (Plato, end of 611). What does he say its origin is? What is justice, then?
B. In "The Tale of the Horses" Chuang-tzu suggests that we are naturally good, and that governance is bad for us. How does Glaucon (or, more precisely, Glaucon's account of what "most people" think justice is) differ?
C. How does Glaucon's account of morality (Plato, end of 611) differ from Tolstoy's? (Think about where morality comes from, what it tells us to do, what may be gained from following it, etc.)

A. Sartre claims that, for us (as opposed to a paper-knife), "existence comes before essence." What does he mean by this? How does it support his claim that "man is in anguish"?
B. What does Sartre mean by "abandonment"? How does he use the example of the pupil who came for advice to explain what abandonment is?
C. What is Sartre telling us about the meaning of life? How is it different from what Chuang-Tzu is telling us?